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PREEMPTION UNDER THE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
ROBERT A. MIKOS
States are conducting bold experiments with marijuana law. Since 1996,
eighteen states and the District of Columbia have legalized the drug for medical
purposes, and two of them have legalized it for recreational purposes as well. 1
These states have also promulgated a growing body of civil regulations to replace
prohibition. The regulations cover nearly every facet of the marijuana market.
Colorado, for example, has adopted more than seventy pages of regulations
governing just the distribution of medical marijuana. 2 Among many other things,
Colorado‘s regulations require medical marijuana vendors to apply for a special

Copyright © 2013 by Robert A. Mikos.
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1. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801–19 (Supp. 2012); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007), § 11362.7–.9; COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-43.3-101–106 (West 2012), § 18-18-406.3 (West 2012), § 25-1.5-106 (West
2012); 2012 CONN. ACTS 55 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4901a–4926a (2011); D.C. CODE
§§ 7-1671 (Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121–128 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2421–2430-B (Supp. 2011); 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. 369 (West);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26421–.26430 (West Supp. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301–
344 (2011); NEV. CONST. art IV, § 38; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 453A.010–.810 (LexisNexis Supp.
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6I-1–16 (West Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2B-1–7 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475.300–.346 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28.6-1–12 (2011);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472–74l (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51A.005–
.903 (West 2012). See also Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions
Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15 (reporting passage of broader marijuana legalization
measures in Colorado and Washington). In addition, at the time of this publication, the Maryland
General Assembly has passed a law legalizing medical marijuana that is waiting for the Governor‘s
signature. See Erin Cox, BALT. SUN (Apr. 8, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-0408/news/bal-medical-marijuana-approved-20130408_1_medical-marijuana-program-maryland-senatemartin-o-malley.
2. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1 (2011). Colorado has proposed similarly comprehensive
regulations to govern the distribution of recreational marijuana. See BARBARA BROHL & JACK FINLAW,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, REGULATION OF MARIJUANA IN
COLORADO 7–8 (2013), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForce
FinalReport.pdf (recommending extensive regulations to govern newly legalized recreational marijuana
market).

5

6

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 16:5

license from the state;3 maintain detailed records of inventory; 4 install advanced
security systems;5 submit to 24/7 web-based video monitoring;6 and verify
customer eligibility.7 The state has even created a Medical Marijuana Enforcement
Division within the Colorado Department of Revenue to enforce these regulations
against the state‘s more than 1,400 medical marijuana dispensaries. 8
But even as new marijuana laws multiply, questions linger about the states‘
authority to conduct these experiments. 9 Congress has banned outright the
possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana10 and authorized harsh
criminal punishment for transgressions.11 The federal government‘s unwavering
commitment to marijuana prohibition has caused many to question the states‘
power to chart a different course. For example, private citizens and government
officials have challenged state authority to legalize marijuana, 12 license marijuana
vendors and consumers,13 prohibit various forms of private discrimination against
3. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1:1.100.
4. See id. at § 1.205 (detailing procedures for handling inventory of medical marijuana).
5. See id. at § 10.200 (mandating that licensed vendors install alarms to protect the premises).
6. See id. at § 10.400 (identifying specifications for video surveillance of medical marijuana
licensed premises).
7. See id. at § 13.100 (mandating that licensed vendors inspect customer medical marijuana
identification cards).
8. See OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR, MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGULATORY SYSTEM PART I:
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT PERFORMANCE
AUDIT 1 (2013), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/OSA/coauditor1.nsf/All/1BB1CBF38E313A1
587257B320079E543/$FILE/2194A%20MedicalMarijuanaRegSys%20031813.pdf/.
9. See, e.g., TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 11
(2012) (noting that courts have failed to resolve several key questions regarding the preemption of state
medical marijuana laws and that it unclear how far states may go in legalizing or regulating medical
marijuana); Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the
United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 160−61 (2012) (noting that case law surrounding state
medical marijuana laws ―reveals how complicated and contested preemption is in this context‖).
10. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2011) (banning the trafficking and possession of marijuana,
respectively).
11. See id. at §§ 841(b), 844(a) (delineating punishment for trafficking and possession offenses,
respectively).
12. E.g., Letter from Governor Pete Wilson to the Cal. State Senate (Sept. 30, 1994) (on file with
author) (vetoing California medical marijuana legalization legislation because it conflicts with federal
law); Charlie Savage, Administration Weighs Legal Action Against States That Legalized Marijuana
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2012, at A20 (reporting that the Obama Administration is considering legal
action against states that have legalized the recreational use of marijuana); Michael Tarm, Former DEA
Heads: Nullify Colorado, Washington Marijuana Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2013, 3:53 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/05/dea-marijuana_n_2810347.html (reporting that former
heads of DEA are urging DOJ to nullify state marijuana legalization laws); Andrea K. Walker, O’Malley
Would Veto Medical Marijuana Bill, BALT. SUN (Mar. 9, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/201203-09/health/bs-hs-medical-marijuana-20120308_1_medical-marijuana-marijuana-and-concernsmedical-necessity (reporting that Maryland‘s governor planned to veto medical marijuana legalization
measure because it would not survive ―federal scrutiny‖).
13. E.g., Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (enjoining a local
marijuana dispensary permit system because it poses an obstacle to the federal CSA), appeal docketed
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marijuana users and their suppliers,14 and return marijuana wrongfully seized by
state agents from medical marijuana patients.15
No one has yet satisfactorily explained the extent of the states‘ authority to
adopt reforms in the face of the federal ban. 16 Neither the United States Supreme
Court, nor any federal appellate court, nor the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) has yet opined on Congress‘s intent to preempt state marijuana reforms. 17
State officials have been left to figure things out for themselves, and on common
issues they have reached wildly different conclusions. For example, officials in
different states disagree about whether states have the power to license marijuana
distributors. A few states have embraced licensing, but others have deemed it
preempted by federal law. 18 Even courts within the same state have disagreed about
state authority to license marijuana distribution in the shadow of the federal ban. 19
sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal.
2012); Preemption of the Ariz. Med. Marijuana Act (Proposition 203), Op. Ariz. Att‘y Gen., No. I12001 (Aug. 6, 2012) (concluding that ―to the extent that an identification card [for medical marijuana
patients] purports to authorize an individual to cultivate marijuana or otherwise violate federal law, such
language is preempted‖); DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, STATE OF DEL., MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROGRAM (last
updated July 3, 2012), http://dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dph/hsp/medmarhome.html (―The creation of the
state-licensed, privately owned compassion centers [in Delaware] has been suspended by the state.
Based on guidance from the US Attorney, the compassion centers concept conflicts with federal law. As
a result there is no plan to open compassion centers at this time.‖).
14. E.g., Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 523–28 (Or.
2010) (refusing to extend state employment discrimination law to cover medical marijuana patients due
to preemption concerns). See also Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 166 (Or.
2006) (Kistler, J., concurring) (―Federal law preempts state employment discrimination law to the extent
that it requires employers to accommodate medical marijuana use.‖).
15. Op. Mich. Att‘y Gen., No. 7262 (Nov. 10, 2011) (concluding that the provision of Michigan
law that requires police to return marijuana seized from qualified medical marijuana patients poses a
direct conflict with and is preempted by the CSA); Op. Or. Att‘y Gen., No. OP-2012-1 (Jan. 19, 2012)
(reaching the same conclusion regarding Oregon‘s comparable law).
16. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. I have also addressed the states‘ power to legalize
marijuana in an earlier Article. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1481 (2009)
(concluding that ―[t]hough Congress has banned marijuana outright through legislation that has survived
constitutional scrutiny, state laws legalizing medical use of marijuana not only remain in effect, they
now constitute the de facto governing law in thirteen states‖). This Article applies, refines, and extends
my prior analysis to the broad array of new regulations states have adopted since that Article was
published.
17. See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (observing that Gonzales v. Raich did not decide whether the CSA
preempted California‘s medical marijuana law); Savage, supra note 12 (reporting that DOJ has not yet
announced how it will respond to marijuana legalization measures).
18. Compare OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR, supra note 8, at 26 (reporting that Colorado has
licensed nearly 500 medical marijuana dispensaries), with DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, STATE OF DEL., supra
note 13 (announcing that Delaware has suspended its marijuana licensing program because it conflicts
with federal law). For a detailed discussion of the licensing issue, see infra Parts II.A & III.B.
19. Compare Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that
federal law preempts local marijuana dispensary permit program), appeal docketed sub nom. Pack v.
S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal. 2012)., with City of
Lake Forest v. Evergreen Holistic Collective, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 361 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012),
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Unfortunately, there is no relief in sight. Members of Congress have proposed
legislation that would help clarify the states‘ power to reform their marijuana
laws.20 But these proposals seem doomed to remain just that.
It is time to clear the smoke. The stakes involved are enormous. Every year,
nearly 900,000 people are arrested for marijuana-related offenses, the vast majority
of them by state officials.21 And every year, a sum of nearly $9 billion is spent on
marijuana prohibition, the bulk of it coming from state coffers. 22 Many states have
come to the conclusion that this long-standing war on marijuana is not worth the
cost, and more states will likely sound the retreat as popular support for marijuana
grows.23 More than ever, we need to figure out what the states are allowed to do.
This Article aims to shed some light on state authority in this realm and
perhaps to generate more generalizable insights about the dangers of broad
preemption doctrines. It argues that courts and commentators have needlessly
muddied the waters by assuming that Congress sought to preempt all state laws that
might somehow conflict with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Under
the test now employed by courts and commentators, state marijuana reforms are
preempted if they require someone to violate federal law, or—more
controversially—if they simply pose an obstacle to some ill-specified congressional
objective. The Article shows how this test has been used to block three types of
laws that Congress either could not or did not want to preempt, namely state laws
that legalize marijuana-related activities, state regulations that restrict such
activities, and state laws that only indirectly promote such activities. To remedy
these mistakes and to dispel confusion, the Article proposes that courts employ a
narrower, and simpler direct conflict rule. Under that rule, state law is preempted
only if it requires someone to violate federal law.

review granted and opinion superseded by 275 P.3d 1266 (Cal. 2012) (finding that federal law does not
preempt local permit program).
20. See, e.g., Respect States‘ and Citizens‘ Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 964, 113th Cong. (1st Sess.
2013) (amending CSA to provide that it shall not be construed to preempt any state law pertaining to
marijuana); see also Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, to R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director of the
Office
of
National
Drug
Control
Policy
(Dec.
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-6-12%20copy%20PJL%20to%20Kerlikowske%20re
%20- %20fed%20drug%20control%20policy.pdf (―Legislative options exist to resolve the differences
between Federal and state law in this area and end the uncertainty that residents of Colorado and
Washington now face.‖).
21. JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG
PROHIBITION 3, tbl. 1, 7, tbl. 4 (2010) (estimating that federal government makes only 5,700 marijuanarelated arrests every year, while states make roughly 872,000 marijuana-related arrests).
22. Id. at 5–6, tbl. 3, 7, tbl. 4 (estimating that prohibition enforcement costs state governments $5.4
billion annually and the federal government another $3.4 billion).
23. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MAJORITY NOW SUPPORTS LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 1 (2013),
available
at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/4-4-13%20Marijuana%20Release.pdf
(reporting results of national survey showing fifty-two percent of adults support legalization of
marijuana).
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The direct conflict test is not, of course, a panacea for all that aches this
growing field. For example, it does not address the nettlesome intra-state
preemption issues now arising in some jurisdictions, nor does it alleviate concerns
over how the federal government might choose to enforce its own drug laws against
private citizens operating in compliance with state law. However, it should alleviate
one of the most serious pains now affecting state marijuana law reform efforts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the broad conflict
preemption rule courts now employ to judge preemption disputes under the CSA.
Part II explains why courts should abandon this approach in favor of a narrower
direct conflict rule. Part III then shows how this direct conflict rule would apply to
a wide range of provisions found in state marijuana law reforms.
I. EXTANT VIEWS OF PREEMPTION UNDER THE CSA
This Part provides some background on preemption. It begins by briefly
reviewing the law of preemption. It then discusses preemption under the CSA,
including how courts and other government actors have interpreted Congress‘s
intent to preempt state marijuana reforms.
A. Background on the Law of Preemption
The issue of preemption arises anytime Congress and the states pass laws that
govern the same activity. The Constitution, of course, makes federal law the
Supreme law of the land, meaning that Congress can normally preempt (i.e., void)
state laws if it so desires.24 The key in every preemption case is thus divining
Congress‘s preemptive intent. 25
The best indication of Congress‘s preemptive intent comes from statutory
language addressing the preemption issue. 26 As the Supreme Court has explained,
when Congress speaks directly to preemption, ―‗there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions‘ of the
legislation.‖27
When Congress neglects to address preemption, courts will nonetheless infer
that Congress intended to preempt state law in two situations. First, the courts infer

24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (―[The] Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.‖). The preemption power is qualified in two important respects. First,
Congress must have the authority to regulate the activity (i.e., to pass legislation) in the first instance.
Second, as discussed below in Part II.A.1, Congress may not use preemption to commandeer state
governments into passing their own regulations.
25. E.g., Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (noting that Congressional intent
is the ―ultimate touch-stone‖ for determining whether state laws are preempted).
26. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 895 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that the plain wording of statutes with express preemption provisions provides the best
evidence of Congress‘s intent to preempt) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664
(1993)).
27. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
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that state law is preempted when Congress passes a ―framework of regulation ‗so
pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it‘ or where
there is a ‗federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.‘‖ 28 This is called field
preemption.
Second, the courts find state law preempted when it conflicts with federal
law. Conflicts come in two basic varieties: direct conflicts and obstacle conflicts.
The narrower of the two, a direct (or impossibility) conflict arises when it is
physically impossible to comply with both state and federal law. 29 This would
happen, say, if state law orders an individual to distribute marijuana to all qualified
medical marijuana patients, because it would be impossible for this person to fulfill
his obligation under state law and simultaneously heed the federal ban on
distributing marijuana.30
The broader type of conflict, called an obstacle (or impediment) conflict,
arises anytime state law ―stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‖ 31 This would happen,
say, if state law barred employers from discriminating against individuals who
participate in the state‘s medical marijuana program. 32 This particular state law
does not require employers to violate federal law; i.e., it does not pose a direct
conflict, because federal law does not require employers to terminate known drug
users.33 Yet the law would still arguably undermine Congress‘s goal of combating
drug abuse because it would protect marijuana users from adverse employment
sanctions, sanctions that might otherwise deter their drug use.
B. Background on Preemption Under the CSA
1. Substance and Purpose of the CSA
The CSA represented a major expansion and reform of federal drug law and
policy.34 Congress passed the CSA primarily to ―conquer drug abuse and to control
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.‖ 35 Under the statute,

28. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
29. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (―A holding of
federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .‖).
30. See infra Part III.C (discussing state distribution of marijuana).
31. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
32. See infra Parts II.A & III.C (discussing state anti-discrimination laws).
33. The only employment related provision in the CSA simply bars drug dealers from using minors
in drug operations. 21 U.S.C. § 861(a) (2011) (―It shall be unlawful . . . to knowingly and
intentionally—(1) employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a person under eighteen years
of age to violate any provision of this subchapter . . . .‖).
34. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2005) (discussing passage of the CSA).
35. See id. at 13.
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all controlled substances are sorted into Schedules I–V based on their psychological
and physical harms, their potential for abuse, and their redeeming therapeutic value
(if any).36 The substances in each category are subjected to varying levels of
controls commensurate with the perceived risks, with Schedule I substances being
the most tightly controlled.37
Congress itself placed marijuana on Schedule I, alongside such drugs as
heroin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). 38 This decision reflects the view that
marijuana is dangerous and lacks any redeeming qualities. 39 In other words, all
marijuana use is considered ―drug abuse‖ under the federal scheme.
To combat the drug, the CSA proscribes the possession, cultivation, and
distribution of marijuana,40 and it imposes harsh criminal sanctions for violations of
these bans.41 The CSA also proscribes various marijuana-related activities.42 Most
importantly, for present purposes, Section 856 of the CSA prohibits knowingly
renting, managing, or using property ―for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance.‖ 43 Section 846 makes it a crime to
attempt or conspire to violate the CSA, 44 and a separate title, 18 U.S.C. Section 2,
also makes it a crime to aid and abet a violation of the CSA. 45
2. Existing Views of Congress’s Preemptive Intentions Under the CSA
The CSA includes an express statement of Congress‘s intent to preempt (or
not) state drug laws.46 Section 903 of the CSA provides:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict

36. The scheduling criteria can be found at 21 U.S.C §§ 811, 812 (2011).
37. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 13.
38. Id. at 14 (discussing Congress‘s decision to place marijuana on Schedule I).
39. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers‘ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (noting that
Congress determined that marijuana had no appreciable medical benefits when it passed the CSA).
40. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2011).
41. E.g., id. at § 841(b)(1)(B) (imposing large fines and a minimum five year prison term for
distribution of more than one hundred kilograms of marijuana).
42. See, e.g., § 843(c)(1) (prohibiting individuals from placing advertisements to buy or sell
Schedule I drugs); § 854(a) (barring the investment or use of any income derived illegally from
violations of the CSA); § 861(a) (making it unlawful to employ or use minors to commit CSA
violations); § 863(a) (prohibiting the distribution of drug paraphernalia).
43. Id. at § 856(a).
44. Id. at § 846.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2011) (imposing accomplice liability on anyone who aids in the commission
of any offense against the United States, including violations of the CSA).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2011).
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between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that
the two cannot consistently stand together. 47
Section 903 is clear in at least one important respect: it rejects any inference
that Congress wanted to preempt the field of drug regulation. 48 Field preemption is
Congress‘s nuclear option. It makes federal law the exclusive law governing a
particular subject.49 But Congress had—and continues to have—strong reasons for
not assuming sole responsibility for drug control. Most importantly, the states have
far greater law enforcement capacity than does the federal government. The states,
for example, handle a very high volume of drug cases every year (more than 1.6
million drug arrests in 2011),50 far more than does the federal government (roughly
31,000 drug arrests in 2009).51 Notwithstanding their relatively permissive
approach to medical marijuana, the states have adopted laws that generally mimic
the substance of the CSA. For example, as of spring 2013, every state except
Colorado and Washington continues to ban marijuana for non-medical purposes.52
If Congress wanted to kick the states out of this field altogether, it would likely
need to hire thousands more federal law enforcement agents, confirm more federal
judges, and build more federal prisons to replace the monumental work now done
by their state counterparts.53
Congress instead chose to preempt state law only to the extent that it
―positive[ly] conflicts‖ with a provision of the CSA governing ―the same subject
matter,‖ such that ―the two cannot consistently stand together.‖ 54 What did

47. Id.
48. Id. (specifying, in relevant part, that ―[n]o provision of this subchapter shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates‖).
49. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 81 (1941) (holding that federal law governs the
registration of immigrants and preempts all state laws concerning such registration).
50. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 1 (2011) (reporting that over 1.6 million arrests were made in 2011 for
drug violations); see also ORG. OF AM. STATES, Guide to Criminal Prosecutions in the United States,
INFORMATION
EXCHANGE
NETWORK,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/usa/en_usa-int-descguide.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (explaining that states prosecute more crimes than does the
federal government).
51. CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40732, FEDERAL DOMESTIC ILLEGAL DRUG
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS: ARE THEY WORKING? 5 (2009).
52. See Healy, supra note 1 (reporting that Colorado and Washington were the first states to
legalize recreational marijuana).
53. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 1464 (―Though the CSA certainly threatens harsh sanctions, the
federal government does not have the resources to impose them frequently enough to make a meaningful
impact on proscribed behavior.‖). See also GARVEY, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining that the federal
government has limited resources that it may rely upon for enforcement of federal drug laws).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2011). As the reader will notice, I have moved the ―same subject matter‖
language into the middle of the most widely quoted phrase of Section 903 (―positive conflict . . . so that
the two cannot consistently stand together‖). This move does not alter the intended meaning of the
passage, but it does serve to highlight an important limitation on the preemptive impact of the CSA that
most courts have ignored. See infra Part II.A.
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Congress mean by this language? In particular, what sort of conflicts did Congress
have in mind to preempt?
Unfortunately, there is very little known legislative history concerning the
meaning of Section 903.55 The express preemption provision apparently garnered
little attention during congressional hearings concerning comprehensive drug law
reforms.56
Prior to the adoption of state medical marijuana laws, the courts had
remarkably few occasions on which to ponder Congress‘s preemptive designs. The
issue did arise in a handful of early cases brought by defendants in state criminal
proceedings.57 The defendants in those cases challenged state drug laws as
preempted because those laws imposed harsher sanctions than those prescribed by
the federal CSA. In other words, the defendants claimed that the CSA established a
ceiling on penalties for drug-related crimes. The preemption challenges were
uniformly rebuffed and the courts spent very little time discussing the issue. 58
But the rapid proliferation of state marijuana law reforms has occasioned the
need for the courts to make more in-depth inquiries into Congress‘s preemptive
intent under the CSA. Courts have been confronted by a growing docket of suits
claiming that state reforms are preempted by the CSA. Indeed, a large number of
courts has already weighed in on the issue.59
In deciding these cases, the courts have dutifully quoted the language of
Section 903.60 But none of them has yet undertaken a sustained effort to discern the

55. The few statements on the record simply reiterate the language that became Section 903. See
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 29, 60 (1970).
56. Id.
57. See State ex rel. Lance v. Dist. Court of Thirteenth Judicial Dist., In & For Yellowstone Cnty.,
542 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Mont. 1975); Wilson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 30, 31–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);
Nichols v. Bd. of Pharm., 657 P.2d 216, 218 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
58. See State ex rel. Lance, 542 P.2d at 1213 (holding that the CSA did not preempt the Montana
Dangerous Drug Act despite significant differences in penalties between the two statutes); Wilson, 525
S.W.2d at 32 (rejecting the notion that differences in punishment constitute a positive conflict); Nichols,
657 P.2d at 219 (holding that Oregon law imposing stricter controls on sale of prescription drugs is not
preempted because it furthers the purpose of the CSA).
59. The following cases discuss in some depth CSA preemption issues surrounding state or local
marijuana laws. Tracy v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487, 2012 WL 928186, at *11–*13 (D. Haw.
Mar. 16, 2012); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 523–28 (Or.
2010); Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 166–68 (Or. 2006); Ter Beek v. City of
Wyoming, 823 N.W.2d 864, 867–73 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); City of Lake Forest v. Evergreen Holistic
Collective, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 353–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted, 275 P.3d 1266 (Cal.
2012); Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 638–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), appeal docketed sub
nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal.
2012); Qualified Patients Ass‘n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 102–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010);
Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 475–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); City of
Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 673–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Haumant v.
Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774, 776–79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
60. E.g., Emerald Steel, 230 P.3d at 527 (―Under the terms of section 903, states are free to pass
laws ‗on the same subject matter‘ as the Controlled Substances Act unless there is a ‗positive conflict‘
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precise meaning of Section 903, that is, what it means for a state law to pose a
positive conflict with a provision of the CSA governing the same subject matter.
Instead, the courts have simply assumed that Congress necessarily intended to
preempt all conflicts with the CSA.61 Under this view, state law is preempted by
the CSA if it makes compliance with federal law impossible or if it undermines the
full achievement of Congress‘s objectives. 62 Notably, this is the same formulation
of the conflict preemption rule courts apply in implied preemption cases. 63
Applying this broad rule, courts have already struck down some state
marijuana reforms. For example, courts have nixed state laws shielding medical
marijuana users from employment discrimination 64 and state and local laws
licensing marijuana distributors.65 Though many reforms have thus far survived
preemption challenges in court, not all of the decisions will necessarily survive
further scrutiny.66 In any event, an even larger number of state reforms has fallen
prey to the rhetoric of conflict preemption outside the courts. To give just a few

between state and federal law ‗so that the two cannot consistently stand together.‘‖) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 903 (2011)).
61. The following cases clearly employ a broad conflicts preemption analysis under the CSA. Ter
Beek, 823 N.W.2d at 867–73; Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 638–42; Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 102–10; Emerald Steel, 230 P.3d at 523–28; City of Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 673–
78; Haumant, 699 N.W.2d at 776–79; Tracy, 2012 WL 928186, at *11–*13. See also Kamin, supra note
9, at 159 (discussing cases and noting that courts now generally hold state law preempted if it requires
someone to violate the CSA or if it ―presents an obstacle to enforcing the CSA‖). Only one court of
which I am aware has applied a narrower direct conflict analysis. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr.3d at
479 (interpreting ―positive conflict‖ language in Section 903 to endorse direct conflict test).
62. See Kamin, supra note 9, at 159.
63. See supra Part I.A (discussing the implied conflicts preemption test). Although the Supreme
Court has employed implied conflict preemption rules in some express preemption cases, the use of the
obstacle preemption prong ―cannot be defended as a general doctrine of statutory interpretation. While
some federal statutes may indeed imply an obstacle-preemption clause, others do not.‖ Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 266 (2000) (emphasis added). See also Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting
Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1158–65 (1998)
(discussing cases in which the Court has found that the presence of an express preemption provision
makes resort to implied preemption analysis inappropriate).
64. E.g., Emerald Steel, 230 P.3d at 523–28 (refusing to extend state employment discrimination
law to cover medical marijuana patients due to preemption concerns); see also Washburn v. Columbia
Forest Prods., Inc., 134 P.3d 161 (Or. 2006) (Kistler, J., concurring) (―Federal law preempts state
employment discrimination law to the extent that it requires employers to accommodate medical
marijuana use.‖).
65. Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 638–42 (holding that a local medical marijuana permit scheme was
preempted by the CSA); Haumant v. Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. App. 2005) (opining that if a city
proposal to ―authorize, license, and regulate a reasonable number of medical marijuana distribution
centers in the City of Minneapolis were to pass, it would be, at least for now, in conflict with current
federal law and would thus be without effect.‖) (internal citations omitted).
66. See, e.g., City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 667 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (suggesting, without explanation, that an order requiring police officers to return marijuana to a
patient was not preempted because it constitutes only a de minimus obstacle to congressional
objectives). See also infra notes 178–190 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing a state court
order that prevented a landlord from evicting a medical marijuana dispensary).
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examples, state officials have balked at passing marijuana legalization measures,67
issuing licenses to marijuana vendors and identification cards to medical marijuana
patients,68 and returning marijuana wrongfully seized from such patients, 69 all
ostensibly out of concern that these reforms have been preempted by the CSA.
***
In sum, courts have applied a broad conflict preemption rule under the CSA.
This rule finds state law preempted if it requires violation of federal law or
otherwise undermines Congress‘s objective of curbing marijuana consumption.
Under this rule, courts have enjoined and state officials have scuttled a number of
important reforms to state marijuana laws.
II. A NEW VIEW OF PREEMPTION UNDER THE CSA
This Part suggests that the CSA should be interpreted more narrowly to
preempt only direct conflicts with the statute. Under a direct conflict rule, state law
is preempted only if it requires someone to violate federal law. Section A suggests
that the broad conflict preemption rule now favored by courts and officials has led
them to condemn three types of state law that Congress either could not or did not
mean to preempt. Section B then suggests that the direct conflict rule would help
courts and lawmakers avoid these errors, without necessarily jeopardizing the
objectives of the CSA. It further suggests that the direct conflict rule would be
easier to apply and would thereby promote consistency and predictability.
A. Why the Obstacle Preemption Rule is too Broad
1. The Commandeering Trap
First, although Congress has the power to preempt state laws that regulate
marijuana, it has no authority to preempt state laws that merely legalize the drug.
For present purposes, regulation entails state interference with marijuana-related
activities (possession, distribution, etc.). Examples include prohibitions against
selling marijuana to minors, requirements that marijuana vendors obtain special
business licenses, and bans on employment discrimination against medical
marijuana users.70 As discussed below, regulations such as these either restrict or
promote marijuana-related activities. Legalization, by contrast, entails a laissez
faire approach in which the state allows some marijuana-related activity to occur
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing California and Maryland governors‘
refusals to enact medical marijuana legislation).
68. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona and Delaware officials‘ refusals
to implement marijuana licensing programs).
69. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan and Oregon Attorneys General
opinions declaring state laws requiring the return of marijuana preempted).
70. See infra Parts III.B–C for a more detailed discussion of state regulations.
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free of state regulation. Examples include repeal of state criminal bans against the
possession of marijuana for medical purposes and repeal of state licensing
sanctions against physicians who recommend the drug to patients. 71 When a state
legalizes marijuana, it simply chooses to leave marijuana-related activities to the
vagaries of private market forces and federal regulation.
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Congress may preempt any state
regulation of marijuana-related activity.72 It could circumscribe or eliminate
altogether state regulation of private activity. When it preempts state regulations,
Congress merely removes state interference—i.e., it forces the state to do nothing.73
Under the Supreme Court‘s anti-commandeering rule, however, Congress
may not likewise preempt state legalization of marijuana-related activity.74 In a
nutshell, the anti-commandeering rule says that Congress may not force the states
to ―enact or administer a federal regulatory program.‖ 75 This means that Congress
could not force the states to enact a marijuana ban. Neither, logically, could it force
the states to keep bans already enacted but no longer wanted.76 To put it another
way, Congress may not ―preempt‖ state legalization, because doing so forces states
to keep pre-existing marijuana bans—bans that Congress could not force the states
to adopt in the first instance. (Congress may, of course, continue to enforce its own
criminal prohibitions, notwithstanding state legalization, but that is only for
purposes of federal proceedings.)
Nonetheless, some courts, officials, and commentators have failed to heed the
distinction between regulating and legalizing marijuana. They have suggested that
state laws that merely allow residents to use marijuana free of state-imposed
constraints have been preempted by the CSA.77 In 1994, for example, Governor
71. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of laws legalizing marijuana-related activities.
72. See generally Nelson, supra note 63.
73. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz,
and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89 (positing that preemption compels state inaction).
74. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 1445–50 (explaining how the anti-commandeering rule limits
Congress‘s power to preempt state law). Congress can always pressure the states to re-criminalize
medical marijuana, but it cannot force them to do so. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (distinguishing conditional spending and conditional preemption from prohibited
commandeering).
75. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
76. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 1446–47 (explaining why the anti-commandeering rule should be
understood to allow states to repeal regulations).
77. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See also Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010) (―To the extent that [Oregon law] authorizes persons
holding medical marijuana licenses to engage in conduct that the Controlled Substances Act explicitly
prohibits, it poses [an] obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congress‘s purposes (preventing all use of
marijuana, including medical uses).‖); Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 652 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (finding that dispensary licensing ordinance posed an obstacle to congressional objectives and
was therefore preempted because it ―authorizes [individuals] to engage in conduct that the federal Act
forbids‖), appeal docketed sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as
moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal. 2012) (citations omitted); Haumant v. Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. App.
2005) (holding that proposed ordinance to allow marijuana dispensaries would be preempted by the
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Pete Wilson of California refused to sign legislation that legalized medical
marijuana under state law, arguing that the measure ―would be preempted by the
federal controlled substances law [which] prohibits the use of marijuana for
medical purposes.‖78 More recently, eight former heads of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) implored the DOJ to pursue legal action to nullify
Colorado‘s and Washington‘s recreational marijuana legalization measures. 79
The obstacle preemption rule has arguably fueled these claims that state
legalization has been preempted by the CSA. After all, it is easy to see how state
legalization threatens to undermine congressional objectives. Congress has long
depended upon the states to wage its war on marijuana. Among other things, the
states have historically handled nearly ninety-nine percent of all marijuana related
arrests.80 The DEA simply cannot pick up the slack if a state legalizes marijuana or
stops enforcing a state ban; the federal government would need to increase its own
efforts nearly one-hundred fold just to maintain the same enforcement rate. There is
little doubt, then, that marijuana use will increase following state legalization. 81
Nonetheless, the anti-commandeering rule does not allow Congress to force states
to suppress the drug. Because the broad language of obstacle preemption does not
incorporate this important constraint on Congress‘s preemptive power, the obstacle
preemption test has led courts and government agents astray.
2. The False Conflict Trap
Second, an examination of its purposes suggests Congress likely wanted to
preempt only those state regulations that promote rather than restrict marijuanarelated activities. Regulations that promote are those that reduce the cost of
engaging in marijuana-related activities.82 Examples include cash subsidies for the
purchase of marijuana and bans on private discrimination against marijuana users. 83
Regulations that restrict marijuana-related activities are those that increase the cost,
federal CSA); Lott v. City of Livonia, No. 10-013917-CZ, slip op. at 28 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2011)
(holding state Medical Marijuana Act preempted because the federal CSA ―completely bans the use of
marihuana‖).
78. See Letter from Governor Pete Wilson to the Cal. State Senate, supra note 12. Other governors
have adopted similar positions. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 12 (discussing Maryland‘s governor‘s plan
to veto medical marijuana legislation because of preemption concerns).
79. See Tarm, supra note 12. See also Savage, supra note 12 (noting that the DOJ is considering a
suit to block state marijuana legalization measures).
80. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUST., DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS,
http://bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2013) (noting that most drug violation
arrests are done at the state and local level).
81. E.g., ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER
VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES 362 (2001) (―[W]e would expect an adult legal market for cannabis to
produce significant increases in prevalence, and possibly intensity of use.‖).
82. Importantly, the baseline here is the proverbial state of nature, i.e., the cost of the activity in
question in a world free of any state interference. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 1445–50, for an
elaboration upon the state-of-nature benchmark.
83. See infra Part III.C.
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however minimally, of engaging in those activities. Examples include licensing
requirements for marijuana vendors, taxes imposed on marijuana sales, and
registration requirements for medical marijuana users. 84 For reasons just discussed,
both types of regulation could be preempted by Congress, but there are strong
reasons to believe that Congress only wanted to preempt regulations that promote
marijuana.
Regulations that promote marijuana-related activities are preempted because
they undermine one of the chief objectives of the CSA—curbing the consumption
of marijuana.85 By definition, such regulations reduce the cost of using, growing, or
distributing marijuana, thereby stimulating more of these activities. For example, a
state marijuana subsidy would reduce the market price of marijuana, resulting in
greater consumption of the drug. Indeed, some of these regulations go so far as to
require individuals to violate the CSA. 86
By contrast, regulations that restrict the marijuana market are not preempted,
because they help to advance Congress‘s objective of curbing marijuana
consumption, at least to some extent. Consider, for example, a state excise tax on
all marijuana sales.87 This tax would be passed on to marijuana consumers, helping
to boost the price of the drug. In turn, higher prices should suppress demand for the
drug.88 Indeed, that is a key assumption behind federal drug enforcement policy. 89
It is even easier to see why Congress does not want to preempt these
regulations once we consider what would happen if it did preempt them.
Preemption would have the very perverse effect of relaxing—not tightening—state
controls on marijuana. In other words, it would widen the gap between state and
federal drug policy. Consider state marijuana licensing programs. Many states want
to limit marijuana distribution (medical or otherwise) to a set of state-licensed
distributors,90 in effect, to create a state-licensed oligopoly. Among other things,
this licensing regime is designed to help the states collect excise taxes from vendors
and prevent unlawful sales to minors.91 The licensing process enables states to
screen out vendors they deem more likely to break state law, and it also enables
states to keep a close eye on the operations of licensees. But if the licensing scheme
84.
85.
86.
87.
tax).
88.

See infra Part III.B.
See supra Part I.A (discussing congressional objectives).
See infra Parts II.B & III.
See BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 2, at 28–32 (discussing Colorado‘s forthcoming marijuana

See CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, STAFF LEGISLATIVE BILL ANALYSIS OF THE
A.B. 390, at 6 (2009) (estimating that a $50
per ounce tax on sales of legalized marijuana would reduce overall consumption by eleven percent).
89. JONATHAN B. CAULKINS ET AL., HOW GOES THE ―WAR ON DRUGS‖? AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
DRUG PROBLEMS AND POLICY 7 (2005) (asserting that ―a principal objective of drug control is to
constrain supply sufficiently to reduce availability and drive up price, making drug use less attractive‖).
90. See infra Part III.B.
91. E.g., JIM LEITZEL, REGULATING VICE: MISGUIDED PROHIBITIONS AND REALISTIC CONTROLS
161–63 (2008) (explaining how licensing requirements can be used to restrict supply).
MARIJUANA CONTROL, REGULATION, AND EDUCATION ACT,
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is blocked by a court, it will be considerably more difficult for the states to collect
taxes from or enforce other regulatory restrictions against marijuana vendors. 92
Congress may want the states to do more, but given how limited its own
enforcement resources are,93 it seems unlikely to refuse whatever drug control
assistance the states might volunteer, no matter how meager.
It is telling that the DOJ itself has not sued to block state regulations of the
medical marijuana market in the past. Indeed, in a twist of irony, the claim that
state medical marijuana regulations are preempted by federal law has been
championed instead by segments of the medical marijuana industry—hardly a
group that shares common goal with Congress. In one suit, for example, a medical
marijuana dispensary in California convinced a state court that a local licensing
requirement was preempted by federal law. 94 It did not do so because it supported
the federal ban, but because it wanted to operate free and clear of the local
government‘s interference—the local government had ordered the dispensary to
close because it failed to comply with the licensing ordinance. 95 Again, it seems
safe to say that the court erred in that case, 96 for Congress would clearly prefer to
have some state-imposed restrictions on marijuana distribution than none at all.
Indeed, the argument that state regulations pose a conflict with the CSA if
they go below some imaginary floor set by the CSA could have dramatic
ramifications. Many states beyond those that have legalized medical and
recreational marijuana outright now regulate the drug less aggressively than does
the federal government.97 For example, a number of states have decriminalized the
simple possession of marijuana.98 They continue to ban possession of the drug, but
they treat violations of their bans as civil infractions subject to small fines. 99 If the
CSA really sets a floor below which state regulations are preempted, it begs the

92. See id. at 162 (noting that licensing requirements can help governments avoid being ―swamped
by the necessity of overseeing thousands of extremely small operations‖).
93. See supra Part I.B (noting Congress‘s comparatively limited drug enforcement capacity).
94. Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 638–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), appeal docketed
sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal.
2012).
95. Id. at 645.
96. The California Supreme Court dismissed the appellate court decision on mootness grounds. See
generally id; Dennis Romero, Marijuana Dispensaries See Hope in California Supreme Court Move on
Pack Case, LA Weekly Blog (Aug. 23, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2012/
08/marijuana_pack_supreme_court_ruling_dispensary_ban.php (discussing the rationale behind the
California Supreme Court‘s decision to deny review in Pack v. Superior Court).
97. Michael O‘Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 829–42 (2004)
(discussing early state marijuana reforms).
98. See Jason Sattler, 14 States That Have Decriminalized Marijuana, THENATIONALMEMO (Apr.
1, 2013, 5:23 pm), http://www.nationalmemo.com/14-states-that-have-decriminalized-marijuana/.
99. Id.
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question whether these civil sanctions and other comparatively lenient criminal
sanctions are likewise preempted by the CSA. 100
Nonetheless, key decision makers have failed to appreciate the way that state
regulations actually serve congressional interests. For example, the Arizona
Attorney General has deemed the states‘ patient identification card program
preempted;101 the Delaware Department of Public Health has suspended the state‘s
medical marijuana licensing program out of preemption concerns; 102 and a
California appellate court enjoined a similar local permitting scheme on obstacle
preemption grounds.103
The capriciousness of obstacle preemption has arguably enabled the argument
that these state regulations are preempted. The rule simply gives courts too much
discretion in framing congressional objectives and in deciding whether state laws
undermine them.104As Mary Davis has observed, ―[t]he flexibility of the Court‘s
‗actual conflict‘ preemption, including as it does the amorphous obstacle
preemption, would seem to support a finding of preemption in virtually all
circumstances.‖105 Consider the opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court showcasing
the deceptive logic of obstacle preemption:
If Congress chose to prohibit anyone under the age of 21 from
driving, states could not authorize anyone over the age of 16 to drive
and give them a license to do so. The state law would stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress (keeping everyone under the age of 21 off the road) and
would be preempted. . . . To the extent that [Oregon law] authorizes
persons holding medical marijuana licenses to engage in conduct that
100. It is also worth noting that the federal government once employed many of the same regulations
now championed by the states. The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, for example, required all persons
selling marijuana to register with the IRS and pay a tax on all sales of the drug. See Richard J. Bonnie &
Charles H. Whitebread, Jr., The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal
History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1062 (1970) (discussing the Act and
its requirements). Indeed, the federal government still uses taxes to combat the marijuana industry.
Benjamin M. Leff, Growing the Business: How legal marijuana sellers can beat a draconian tax,
Slate.com (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2013/02/how_legal_marijuana_sellers_can_beat_a_draconian_federal_tax.html?fb_ref=s
m_fb_share_chunky (discussing federal tax rules designed to combat illicit drug distribution).
101. Preemption of the Ariz. Med. Marijuana Act, supra note 13 (declaring that the state medical
marijuana identification card program is preempted to the extent that it ―purports to authorize an
individual to cultivate marijuana‖).
102. See DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 13.
103. Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), appeal docketed sub
nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal.
2012).
104. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 882
(2008) (lamenting that ―‗obstacle‘ preemption based on federal statutes‖ is ―vague and provide[s] little
basis for confidence about outcomes‖).
105. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 1021
(2002).
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the Controlled Substances Act explicitly prohibits, it poses the same
obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congress‘s purposes
(preventing all use of marijuana, including medical uses).106
As noted above, one California appellate court employed similar logic to
conclude that a local ordinance requiring medical marijuana dispensaries to obtain
a permit from a city government posed an obstacle to the CSA. The court reasoned
that the hefty fee charged by the city for such permits favored large scale marijuana
producers of the sort that are prime targets of federal law enforcement agencies. 107
However, the court could easily (and more accurately) have found that the
permitting requirement promoted rather than obstructed Congress‘s aims. After all,
by charging dispensaries a hefty ($14,742) annual fee 108 the city was no doubt
helping to curb the marijuana market. 109 It seems Congress has little to gain (and
much to lose) from preempting licensing schemes and other state regulatory
restrictions, but the obstacle preemption inquiry is seemingly malleable enough to
support a verdict to the contrary.
3. The Indirect Conflict Trap
Third, and finally, Congress more clearly indicated that it wanted to preempt
state regulations only if they directly promote marijuana-related activities.
Regulations that directly promote marijuana-related activities are those governing
subjects explicitly addressed by the CSA. By contrast, regulations that only
indirectly promote marijuana-related activities are ones that lower the cost of such
activities, but do so in a way not addressed by the CSA. To illustrate the
distinction, compare a state law shielding marijuana users from eviction with a state
law shielding such users from employment termination. Both laws arguably
promote marijuana-related activities—the landlord-tenant law because it lessens the
risk of losing one‘s apartment and the employment law because it lessens the risk
of losing one‘s job. But only the former law promotes marijuana activities in a
manner that is directly addressed by the CSA. As noted above, the CSA expressly
bars landlords from renting to anyone they know will use the property to consume
or distribute drugs.110 By contrast, the CSA does not purport to regulate the

106. Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or.
2010).
107. Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 653 n.31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), appeal docketed
sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal.
2012). The court reasoned that although the ―high costs of compliance with the City‘s ordinance may
have the practical effect of allowing only large-scale dispensaries . . . . these large-scale dispensaries are
precisely the type of dispensaries the licensing of which the U.S. Attorney General believes stands as an
obstacle to the enforcement of the CSA.‖ Id.
108. Id. at 643–44.
109. See LEITZEL, supra note 91, at 140–77 (explaining how licensing and other civil regulations can
be used to curb drug consumption).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2011); see also infra Part III.C.
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employer-employee relationship.111 In other words, the CSA does not prohibit
employers from hiring drug-using individuals.
Regulations directly promoting marijuana activities are plainly preempted
because they immediately impact congressional drug control goals. Indeed, one
could argue that such laws invariably make it impossible to comply with both state
and federal law—a type of conflict Congress undoubtedly sought to prevent. 112
By contrast, regulations that only indirectly promote marijuana are not
preempted because Congress expressly spared them. This choice is evident from
the language of Section 903. In particular, Section 903 provides that a state law is
preempted only to the extent that it ―positive[ly] conflict[s]‖ with a provision of the
CSA governing the ―same subject matter,‖ ―so that the two cannot consistently
stand together.‖113 The highlighted language suggests Congress did not want to
preempt all state laws that impacted drug behavior but only those laws that did so
in a way the CSA directly addresses, i.e., only when state law regulates a specific
subject, say, the landlord-tenant relationship, that is also regulated by the CSA.
It is easy to see why Congress might want to spare state regulations that only
indirectly promote marijuana-related activities. Although these laws might
undermine somewhat Congress‘s objective of curbing marijuana consumption,
subjecting them to preemption challenges could prove enormously burdensome for
the courts and for state and local officials. After all, countless state laws, including
many wholly unrelated to the drug law field, could promote drug use at the margin.
Suppose, for example, that a city imposes a special assessment to widen and abate
congestion on a public road that happens to be connected to a popular marijuana
dispensary. One could argue that this expenditure of public funds would undermine
Congress‘s goal of combatting marijuana distribution; among other things, the road
improvement would likely make it easier for residents to shop at the dispensary.
And any disgruntled payers of the special assessment would likely have standing
(in state court, if not federal) to challenge the roadway program as preempted. 114
But it seems hard to imagine that Congress would want the CSA to be used as a
sword against state laws having only tangential relevance to drug abuse. After all,
preemption lawsuits could wreak havoc on the administration of mundane state and
local government programs. As the Supreme Court has observed, it arguably

111. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that the only employment-related provision of
the CSA simply bars using minors to commit drug crimes).
112. See, e.g., See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (―A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design
where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .‖).
113. 21 U.S.C. § 903.
114. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1854 (2001) (noting that states generally grant citizens standing to
challenge public expenditures in state court); see also Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the
Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol‘y Rev. 633, 661–64
(2011) (analyzing who would have standing to bring CSA preemption challenges against state laws).
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―frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that
whatever furthers the statute‘s primary objective must be the law, 115 given that
―‗no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.‘‖ 116
Unfortunately, again, some courts and commentators have failed to heed this
distinction. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that a state law
barring employment discrimination against medical marijuana users is preempted
because it conflicts with congressional objectives. 117 The problem here is not the
court‘s capacity for applying obstacle preemption, for it is surely correct that
extending employment discrimination to cover drug use would impair at least one
congressional objective, as just discussed. Rather, the problem is the court‘s
assumption that obstacle preemption applies to this case despite Congress‘s express
statutory language disavowing such intent. In their dogged application of broad
implied conflict preemption principles, courts have simply paid no attention to the
―same subject matter‖ limiting language of Section 903.118
B. Why a Direct Conflict Rule Would be Better
The obstacle preemption rule has arguably led courts astray. This Section
suggests that courts should instead employ a narrower direct conflict rule under the
CSA. It begins by demonstrating why the direct conflict rule would help courts to
avoid the mistakes outlined above, without necessarily running the risk of
permitting too many conflicts to go unresolved. It also suggests that the direct
conflict rule would be simpler for courts and lawmakers to apply, thereby providing
clearer guidance about state power to reform marijuana laws.
1. Type I Errors
A direct conflict rule would help courts avoid the three errors identified
above. I label these ―Type I‖ errors because they condemn state laws Congress
could not or did not want to preempt. To begin, the narrower direct conflict rule
would avoid the commandeering trap. This is because the CSA imposes only
negative duties, i.e., duties to refrain from certain activities; it does not purport to

115. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987).
116. Id. at 525–26.
117. See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 520 (Or. 2010)
(holding that an employer was not required to accommodate employee‘s use of medical marijuana).
118. Indeed, one court has carelessly opined that ―express preemption is inapplicable because there
is no express preemption provision in the CSA.‖ Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 823 N.W.2d 864, 871
n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added). Lest the reader think that statement is an isolated incident
of confusion, consider the following passage from a California appellate court: ―With this language [of
Section 903], Congress declined to assert express preemption in the area of controlled substances and
directly foreswore field preemption, leaving only conflict preemption and obstacle preemption as
potential bases supporting the trial court‘s preemption ruling.‖ Qualified Patients Ass‘n v. City of
Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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require anyone to combat marijuana.119 Hence, a state law that simply bars state
agents from combatting marijuana-related activities could not plausibly be
interpreted to pose a direct conflict with the CSA. When a state agent refuses to
combat federally proscribed behavior, she neither helps nor hinders a citizen‘s
decision to engage in that behavior, in the legally relevant sense; she simply leaves
that decision to the whims of the market and the federal government. In other
words, a citizen can obey the CSA‘s negative duties and state law‘s refusal to
impose the same by not engaging in the federally proscribed behavior. 120
The direct conflict rule likewise eliminates the risk of preempting state
regulations that restrict the marijuana market on the dubious logic that such
regulations somehow impede congressional purposes. Consider licensing programs.
The act of issuing a state license to a drug dealer does not itself constitute a crime
under the CSA. True, the drug dealer violates the CSA if she distributes marijuana,
but that action is not attributable to the state. A license does not make the dealer a
state actor or otherwise make the state responsible for her actions; 121 it does not
force her to actually distribute marijuana;122 and it provides no aid, at least in the
relevant sense—i.e., it only protects her from legal sanctions the state is not obliged
to impose.
Lastly, the direct conflict rule would eliminate the risk of mistakenly
condemning state laws that only indirectly frustrate congressional aims. Almost by
definition, a direct conflict pits a state law governing X against a provision of the
CSA that also governs X (whatever X might be). As discussed above, for example,
a state law that requires a landlord to rent property to a medical marijuana
dispensary poses a direct conflict with the CSA, because Section 856 of the statute
expressly forbids landlords from renting property they know is being used to
distribute marijuana.123 Not by coincidence, these two laws govern the same subject

119. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 1451 (―[T]he CSA does not proscribe omissions; that is, it does not
impose any duty to act (generally applicable or otherwise), such as a duty to report known violations.‖).
In theory, Congress could amend the CSA to impose some generally applicable affirmative duties on
state officials. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177–78 (1992) (suggesting that Congress
can impose generally applicable duties on states without violating the anti-commandeering rule).
120. Cf. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (illustrating a
situation under which a direct conflict might arise). See also Nelson, supra note 63, at 228 n.15 (―The
Supreme Court has made clear that even if one sovereign‘s law purports to give people a right to engage
in conduct that the other sovereign‘s law purports to prohibit, the ‗physical impossibility‘ test is not
satisfied; a person could comply with both state and federal law simply by refraining from the
conduct.‖).
121. E.g., Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 189 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding that a
state licensed casino is not a state actor).
122. See City of Lake Forest v. Evergreen Holistic Collective, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 361 n.12 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012), review granted and opinion superseded by 275 P.3d 1266 (Cal. 2012) (―Local
conditional use permits issued to [medical marijuana] dispensaries . . . generally would not trigger
federal preemption because issuing a permit does not constitute a local government command to operate
a dispensary . . . Simply put, a permit holder need not act on the permit.‖).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2011); see also infra Part III.C.
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matter—the landlord-tenant relationship in drug cases. By contrast, a state law that
bars a private employer from discriminating against a medical marijuana user does
not pose a direct conflict because the CSA does not purport to govern the subject of
employer-employee relations.124
2. Type II errors
The direct conflict rule would also safely avoid Type II errors, namely,
upholding state laws that Congress did want to preempt. It is true that the direct
conflict rule normally poses a real danger of Type II errors, because under most
statutes that rule will be ―vanishingly narrow.‖ 125 But the CSA is no ordinary
statute. The danger of Type II errors is minimized by the sheer breadth of the
statute. The CSA unequivocally proscribes a sweeping array of drug-related
behaviors: the possession, cultivation, and distribution of drugs; renting property
for said purposes; attempts and conspiracies to do any of the above; and even
aiding and abetting another to do so.126
In the face of so many proscriptions, it seems improbable that a state could
seriously undermine the CSA without creating a direct conflict. The direct conflict
rule thus would be far from toothless. It preempts the most glaring and troublesome
state challenges to federal drug authority. For example, it plainly stops states from
distributing marijuana through state-owned and operated dispensaries.127
In any event, the Supreme Court has suggested that avoiding Type I errors is a
more pressing concern than avoiding Type II errors. The Court‘s preference for
preserving state laws is evident from the oft-invoked presumption that ―the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‖ 128 This so-called presumption
against preemption clearly favors upholding state law even when it means
potentially sacrificing some federal objectives.
3. Simplicity
A final argument in favor of the direct conflict rule is that it is comparatively
simple to apply. Obstacle preemption is a notoriously difficult test to apply. 129 It
124. See supra note 33 (noting that the only employment-related provision of the CSA simply bars
using minors to commit drug crimes).
125. Nelson, supra note 63, at 228.
126. See supra Part I.A (discussing substantive provisions of the CSA).
127. See infra Part III.C.
128. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
129. E.g., Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.
J. 326, 335 (2007) (commenting that obstacle preemption is ―too ambiguous‖ and ―because of its
uncertainty, risks improper incursions on federalism by overturning perfectly valid state laws‖); Paul E.
McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 833–34 (1995) (stating that obstacle preemption entails ―a difficult and
largely undefined inquiry into the policies underlying a statutory scheme‖).
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requires courts to look beyond statutory text to divine congressional purposes and
to determine whether any number of distinct state laws might undermine those
purposes. The Supreme Court has given little helpful advice as to how these tasks
are to be performed. 130 No wonder, then, that courts and lawmakers have struggled
mightily to understand preemption in the context of state marijuana law reforms.
The direct conflict rule places comparatively few demands on the courts.
They need not look beyond the statute for its purposes, and they need not employ
sophisticated social science reasoning to assess whether any given state law might
hinder such purposes. Instead, courts need only determine whether a given state
law requires someone to violate federal law, and on that question they can consult
the substantive provisions of the CSA and employ familiar legal reasoning for
answers. To be sure, there will continue to be some tricky cases 131 and mistakes
will be made.132 But the relative ease of this task should generate more accurate,
predictable, and consistent judgments across cases. As one scholar surmised,
―[a]mong the three forms of implied preemption, impossibility preemption is
uncontroversial and unproblematic . . . .‖133
***
In sum, there are three important limitations on the preemptive scope of the
CSA. First, under the Court‘s anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress may not
preempt state laws that merely legalize marijuana-related activities. Second, given
the federal government‘s very limited law enforcement capacity, Congress likely
did not want to preempt any state regulations that help reduce drug abuse. Third,
even when state regulations increase drug abuse, Congress expressly indicated that
it only wanted to preempt those that do so directly. The courts must heed these
limits, and the best way to do so would be to adopt a direct conflict rule for

130. E.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B. U. L. REV.
685, 687 (1991) (arguing that the Court has failed to detail a coherent standard for lower courts for
preemption cases); Donald P. Rothschild, A Proposed “Tonic” With Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New
Federalism: How to Deal with the “Headache” of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 829, 857 (1984)
(―[The] ‗frustration of federal purpose‘ test enunciated in Hines has been applied with amazing
inconsistency.‖).
131. See infra Part III.A (discussing complicated issues surrounding the question of whether laws
requiring police to return marijuana pose a direct conflict with the CSA).
132. For example, several county attorneys in Arizona recently issued a letter to Governor Jan
Brewer, arguing (erroneously) that the ―[t]he implementation and facilitation‖ of the state‘s dispensary
licensing and patient registration card programs ―constitute federal crimes‖ and were thus preempted.
Letter from Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai Cnty. Att‘y, to the Honorable Janice K. Brewer, Governor of
Ariz. (July 24, 2012) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy). It is difficult to imagine a
theory under which a state official could actually be prosecuted simply for issuing a license to a
marijuana dispensary. See infra Part III.B (explaining why licensing does not violate federal law).
133. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or
Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 200 (2009).
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adjudicating preemption disputes under the CSA. 134 The next Part demonstrates
how that rule should be applied to a variety of common state drug law reforms.
III. WHICH STATE LAWS POSE A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE CSA?
This Part discusses which, if any, state law reforms pose a direct conflict with
and are thus preempted by the CSA. To organize the discussion, I categorize these
laws according to the framework developed in Part II.A above: A) laws that
legalize marijuana-related activities;135 B) laws that restrict marijuana-related
activities;136 and C) laws that promote marijuana-related activities.137 I will describe
the laws falling into each of these categories and analyze which, if any, poses a
direct conflict with the CSA.
A. Laws that Legalize Marijuana-related Activities
The first type of law legalizes the possession, cultivation, and distribution of
marijuana under state law. As discussed above in Part II.A, a state legalizes
marijuana when it indicates that it will not impose its own sanctions for possessing,
cultivating, or distributing the drug. The sanctions include both criminal penalties,
such as jail and fines, as well as civil sanctions, such as the denial of privileges and
forfeiture of property. For example, Maine law provides that individuals who meet
the criteria of the state‘s medical marijuana program may not ―be denied any right
or privilege or be subjected to arrest, prosecution, penalty or disciplinary action‖ by
state authorities for possessing or growing marijuana. 138 Similarly, most states
prohibit state medical boards from discriminating against physicians who
recommend marijuana to patients.139 For example, California‘s Health and Safety
Code provides that ―no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right
or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical
purposes.‖140
As should be obvious at this point, the legalization of marijuana under state
law does not pose a direct conflict with the CSA. A citizen can obey a state law
allowing or even authorizing the possession, distribution, or cultivation of

134. A direct conflict rule is not the only option, of course. In theory, the courts could modify the
obstacle preemption rule to avoid the three Type I errors identified in Part II.A. But apart from serving
no real purpose—the direct conflict rule already avoids these errors—the modification would make the
obstacle preemption rule even more complex and difficult to apply.
135. See infra Part III.A.
136. See infra Part III.B.
137. See infra Part III.C.
138. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E (Supp. 2011). California has a similar law. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 2012) (exempting patients and their caregivers who
receive proper approval from a physician from criminal penalties for the possession and/or cultivation of
marijuana).
139. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(c) (West Supp. 2012).
140. Id.
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marijuana and the CSA‘s express ban on these same activities by not engaging in
them.141 Importantly, legalizing the drug for purposes of state law does not pressure
a citizen to violate federal law. No state, for example, imposes a marijuana mandate
on its residents. States simply leave their choices to the vagaries of federal law
enforcement and the private market. Neither do state officials somehow violate
federal law when, pursuant to state law, they refuse to lift a finger against
marijuana.142 The CSA does not, and, as discussed above, cannot, oblige state
officials to punish people for possessing, cultivating, or distributing marijuana. 143
Several courts have drawn a spurious distinction between legalization and
authorization.144 Whether a state law speaks in terms of authorization or
legalization is wholly immaterial, so long as the effect is merely to lift stateimposed sanctions. For example, a state might adopt a marijuana law that provides
―Person A is authorized to use marijuana‖ or it might instead adopt a law that
provides ―It is legal for Person A to use marijuana.‖ Despite the variance in
language, both laws have the same practical effect; they bar state officials from
punishing Person A for using marijuana.
A more tenable preemption challenge has been raised against state laws that
require police officers to return any marijuana they have seized from patients and
dispensaries in violation of state anti-seizure laws.145 As just noted, those antiseizure laws themselves do not pose a direct conflict with the CSA, because the
CSA neither does nor could require state officers to seize marijuana they might
observe. But what happens if a police officer disregards her state‘s anti-seizure law
and seizes marijuana anyway? May the state undo the wrongful seizure by ordering
the officer to return the marijuana to its original owner?
At first glance, this situation does seem to pose a direct conflict with the CSA
because the police officer who returns marijuana to a private citizen arguably
violates the CSA. To be sure, the officer is merely trying to undo a state-imposed
sanction (the seizure of the drug) and does not necessarily want to help the citizen
141. See, e.g., Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 823 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (finding
Michigan‘s medical marijuana law does not pose direct conflict with CSA because, while the CSA
prohibits use of marijuana in any context, Michigan‘s medical marijuana law permits but does not
command use of marijuana, thereby making it possible to comply with both statutes).
142. See supra Part II.A.
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See, e.g., Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529–30
(Or. 2010) (opining that to the extent Oregon‘s medical marijuana law affirmatively authorizes
marijuana use it is in direct conflict with the CSA); Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 651
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (―There is a distinction, in law, between not making an activity unlawful and
making the activity lawful.‖), appeal docketed sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012), and
appeal dismissed as moot, 283 P.3d 1159 (Cal. 2012).
145. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.26424(h) (Supp. 2012) (requiring the return of medical
marijuana paraphernalia that has been unlawfully seized from qualified patients); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
26-2B-4(G) (Supp. 2011) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.323(2) (2011) (same); see also City of Garden
Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding an order requiring
police officers to return seized medical marijuana to patient).
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consume the drug. But the CSA, in relevant part, proscribes knowingly or
intentionally distributing marijuana,146 and it defines distribution simply as the ―the
actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance.‖ 147 In other
words, on its face, the CSA does not require that the transferor have any particular
purpose (commercial or otherwise) in mind. 148 Hence, a police officer who takes
marijuana from an evidence lock-up room and transfers it to the private citizen
from whom it was wrongfully seized has seemingly met all of the elements of a
drug distribution offense under the CSA. Indeed, top law enforcement officials in at
least two states have concluded that provisions of state law requiring them to return
seized marijuana pose a direct conflict with the CSA for this reason and are thus
preempted.149 As the Attorney General of Michigan explains,
If a law enforcement officer returns [marijuana] to a patient or
caregiver as required by [the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act], the
officer is distributing or aiding and abetting the distribution or
possession of [marijuana] by the patient or caregiver in violation of
the [federal] CSA. Thus, a Michigan law enforcement officer cannot
simultaneously comply with the federal prohibition against
distribution or aiding and abetting the distribution or possession of
[marijuana] and the state prohibition against forfeiture of
[marijuana].150
Nonetheless, there are at least two arguments suggesting that a police officer
who simply returns marijuana to its original owner does not, in fact, violate the
CSA in the process. One textualist argument rests upon an obscure provision of the
CSA, Section 885(d), to suggest that Congress has expressly immunized the actions
of state police officers who distribute marijuana pursuant to state law. 151 Section
885(d) provides, in relevant part, that ―no civil or criminal liability shall be
imposed . . . upon any duly authorized officer of any State . . . who shall be
lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to
controlled substances.‖152 A few courts have held that this provision immunizes the
act of returning medical marijuana to its owner pursuant to a state statute or court
order.153 Not all courts agree with this view, 154 however, and I have criticized this

146. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2011).
147. §§ 802(8), (11).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 919 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that
―distribution,‖ as defined by the CSA, is not limited to merely selling controlled substances but broadly
includes any transfer of a controlled substance).
149. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of the Michigan and Oregon
Attorneys General).
150. Op. Mich. Att‘y Gen., supra note 15.
151. 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (2011).
152. Id.
153. See generally State v. Okun, 296 P.3d 998 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that Section 885(d)
gave state police officer immunity from CSA prosecution for returning marijuana to its owner pursuant
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interpretation of Section 885(d) as being ―difficult to reconcile with the CSA‘s
express preemption language and congressional intent.‖ 155
A second purposivist argument instead suggests that state police officers do
not actually violate the CSA when they return wrongfully seized marijuana to its
owner because such distribution is innocent. Some state courts have recognized an
―innocent distribution defense‖ to state drug charges when there is ―evidence that
the possession was incidental and lasted no longer than reasonably necessary to
permit a return to the owner, a surrender to authorities, or other suitable
disposal.‖156 The defense is designed to prevent egregious results that might
otherwise arise from the rigid application of drug laws. 157 As one court explained,
A parent confiscating drugs from his or her child, a teacher finding
drugs in his or her classroom, a daughter picking up a prescription
for her bedridden parent, a homeowner finding medicine left behind
by a guest, all could be, deemed illegal possessors under strictly
construed possession statutes. Moreover, if the teacher transferred the
drugs to his or her principal, or the homeowner gave the drugs to the
guest‘s spouse who came by to pick them up, the teacher and
homeowner could be deemed guilty of trafficking as well. We are
confident that the General Assembly did not intend to criminalize the
possession or transfer of controlled substances in circumstances such
as these.158
No federal court has yet explicitly recognized or rejected the defense for
purposes of the federal CSA, but the reasons for doing so are just as strong as they
are for its state law analogs.159 It seems implausible Congress would have wanted
to criminalize the innocent actions highlighted above, e.g., a parent confiscating

to state‘s medical marijuana law); City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 664
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (same); State v. Kama, 39 P.3d 866, 868 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (suggesting
that Section 885(d) does not confer immunity for enforcing laws that conflict with the CSA), rev’d on
other grounds, 454 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2006).
155. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 1458–59. In any event, even if Section 885(d) bars a court from
holding a state officer criminally liable, it might not block the court from enjoining the officer from
performing her job. In other words, Section 885(d) might not eliminate the direct conflict but instead
might simply limit the application of criminal sanctions.
156. Commonwealth v. Adkins, 331 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Ky. 2011); see also State v. Miller, 193 P.3d
92, 97 (Utah 2008) (holding that the ―innocent possession‖ defense applies if the drug was obtained
innocently and if the individual‘s possession of the drug was limited by scope and time).
157. See Adkins, 331 S.W.3d at 263–64 (discussing the reasons for the ―innocent possession‖
defense).
158. Id. at 264.
159. The federal courts have the power to recognize un-enumerated defenses to federal crimes. See
NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 415 (5th ed. 2010)
(―Where there is no statute [explicitly recognizing a defense], the federal courts must both decide
whether such a defense exists, and then describe the contours of the defense and allocate the burden of
proof.‖).
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drugs from a child, but the CSA would do just that unless courts recognize an
innocent possession and distribution defense. 160 Recognizing such a defense would
seemingly allow state police to return medical marijuana to private citizens from
whom it was seized.161
B. Laws that Restrict Marijuana-related Activities
The second type of state law restricts the manufacture, distribution, and
possession of marijuana. One body of law regulates the supply of marijuana. This
body includes regulations that require suppliers to obtain a license from the state,
laws that dictate how suppliers operate (e.g., zoning), laws that tax the sale of
marijuana, and so on. Colorado, for example, has adopted a very comprehensive set
of regulations governing medical marijuana dispensaries. 162 Inter alia, the Colorado
regulations require a license to distribute marijuana, 163 restrict who may obtain such
a license,164 require licensees to submit to 24/7 web-based video monitoring of
premises,165 bars suppliers from employing minors,166 and requires suppliers to take
steps to verify buyer eligibility for every purchase. 167
A second body of law likewise regulates the consumption of marijuana. This
body includes laws that stipulate the steps patients must take to establish eligibility
for the medical marijuana defense and laws that limit the consumption behavior of
marijuana users. For example, New Mexico requires all prospective medical
marijuana patients to first register with the state‘s health agency, a process that
entails submitting detailed medical information from a board licensed physician. 168
The state also limits each registered patient to consuming no more than two ounces
in any thirty-day period,169 and it prohibits patients from consuming marijuana in
public places.170
160. See Adkins, 331 S.W.3d at 264 (suggesting that a legislative body would not intend to punish
possession of marijuana that is truly innocent).
161. It would depend, of course, on how the federal courts would define the defense. See, e.g., id.
(allowing the defense if possession is ―incidental‖ and the length of possession is reasonable); State v.
Miller, 193 P.3d 92, 97 (Utah 2008) (holding that the innocent possession defense applies if the drug is
obtained ―innocently‖ and possession was ―transitory‖). See also ALEX KREIT, CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES: CRIME REGULATION, AND POLICY 139–54 (2013) (discussing the ―possession for
disposal‖ doctrine).
162. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-43.3-101 to -1001 (West Supp. 2011) (establishing
requirements and guidelines for all approved businesses involved in the cultivation, manufacture or sale
of medical marijuana). Colorado has proposed similar regulations to govern distributors of recreational
marijuana. See generally BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 2.
163. COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1:1.100 (2011).
164. § 12-43.3-307.
165. § 212-1:10.400.
166. § 212-1:5.100.
167. § 212-1:13.100.
168. N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.3.9 (2010).
169. § 7.34.2.7(D).
170. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-5(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
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Regulations such as these clearly do not pose a direct conflict with the CSA.
It is always possible for someone to comply with the regulations imposed by state
law and the prohibition imposed by federal law by not engaging in the federally
proscribed activity. Return to the example of marijuana licensing laws. According
to the Supreme Court, a license is simply ―‗a right or permission granted in
accordance with law . . . to engage in some business or occupation, to do some act,
or to engage in some transaction which but for such license would be unlawful.‘‖ 171
No one is required to seek a license in the first instance, and even those who do
obtain one are not obliged to actually use it, i.e., to distribute marijuana. 172
C. Laws that Promote Marijuana-related Activities
A third category of laws arguably promotes marijuana-related activities. One
set of laws within this category aims to protect marijuana users (and perhaps
suppliers) from sanctions imposed by other private individuals and firms. A
handful of states now prohibit landlords from discriminating against medical
marijuana patients based solely on their status as such.173 For example, Arizona law
provides that ―No . . . landlord may refuse to . . . lease to and may not otherwise
penalize a person solely for his status as a [medical marijuana] cardholder, unless
failing to do so would cause the . . . landlord to lose a monetary or licensing related
benefit under federal law.‖174
To the extent that these laws merely protect individuals based on their status
as drug users, they do not pose a direct conflict and are not preempted. The CSA
does not prohibit anyone from housing drug users. However, if these laws were
interpreted to prohibit landlords from evicting individuals for consuming or
distributing marijuana on rental property, they would clearly pose a direct conflict
with the CSA.175 That is because Section 856 expressly forbids landlords from
renting property if they know it is being used to manufacture, distribute, or
171. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978 (2011) (quoting
WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1304 (2002)).
172. See Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 823 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (commenting
that an individual could comply with a state act allowing for medical marijuana use and the CSA at the
same time because the state act does not mandate marijuana use, it only permits its use). Similarly,
philatelists commonly acquire marijuana tax stamps from the states with no intention whatsoever of ever
selling the drug. See, e.g., Marijuana Tax Stamps Still On Sale Even Though Law Up In Smoke,
COMMONWEALTH CONVERSATIONS: REVENUE, TAXES CHILD SUPPORT & LOCAL SERVS. INFO. FROM
THE DEP‘T OF REVENUE (Mar. 30, 2012), http://revenue.blog.state.ma.us/blog/2012/03/marijuana-taxstamps-still-on-sale-even-though-law-is-kaput.html (noting that some stamp collectors sell marijuana tax
stamps as collectibles on internet auction sales sites).
173. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(A) (Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4905A
(Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN LAWS § 21-28.6-4
(West Supp. 2011); 2012 Conn. Legis. Serv. 12-55 (West).
174. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. at § 36-2813(A).
175. Most laws do not reach so far, and indeed, some states expressly provide that a landlord is not
required to lease property when doing so would violate federal law or cause the landlord to lose federal
funding. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (Supp. 2011).
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consume illegal drugs.176 It would be impossible for a landlord to obey this
prohibition without incurring liability under the hypothetical state nondiscrimination law.177
A recent eviction case in California appears to have created just such a direct
conflict with the CSA. In the case, a landlord filed an unlawful detainer lawsuit in
state court seeking to evict a prominent medical marijuana dispensary (Harborside
Health Center) because the dispensary was distributing marijuana on the
premises.178 The court, however, denied the eviction, finding that the tenant‘s right
to use the rental property to distribute marijuana was protected by state law. 179 The
ruling literally makes it impossible for the landlord to comply with Section 856
(i.e., to remove the tenant) because, under California law,
[t]he landlord must use [the unlawful detainer process] to evict the
tenant; the landlord cannot use self-help measures to force the tenant
to move. For example, the landlord cannot physically remove or lock
out the tenant, cut off utilities such as water or electricity, remove
outside windows or doors, or seize (take) the tenant‘s belongings in
order to carry out the eviction. The landlord must use the court
procedures.180
The court plainly erred. It seems beyond question that Congress would want
to stop states from compelling residents to violate federal law.
Some states likewise prohibit employers from discriminating against medical
marijuana patients. For example, Delaware law provides that
an employer may not discriminate against a person in hiring,
termination, or any term or condition of employment, or otherwise
penalize a person, if the discrimination is based upon . . . [his/her]
status as a [medical marijuana] cardholder . . . or [his/her] . . .
positive drug test for marijuana . . . unless the patient used,
possessed, or was impaired by marijuana on the premises of the place
of employment or during the hours of employment. 181

176. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2011).
177. Id. An aggrieved tenant would presumably be authorized to seek damages from the landlord for
violating state anti-discrimination law. See, e.g., CAL. DEP‘T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, THE EVICTION
PROCESS, http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/evictions.shtml (noting that under
California eviction law, ―[i]f the landlord uses unlawful methods to evict a tenant, the landlord may be
subject to liability for the tenant‘s damages, as well as penalties of up to $100 per day for the time that
the landlord used the unlawful methods‖).
178. Paul T. Rosynsky, Landlord Can’t Evict Oakland’s Largest Medical Marijuana Dispensary,
OAKLAND TRIB. (Dec. 4, 2012, 6:33 AM).
179. Id.
180. CAL. DEP‘T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 177 (describing California eviction law).
181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4905A (Supp. 2011); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(A)
(Supp. 2012) (prohibiting an employer from penalizing a person for their status as a cardholder).
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Employment laws such as this do not pose a direct conflict with the CSA
because the CSA does not prohibit (most) firms from employing drug users. That
is, an employer can keep a known drug user on the payroll per state law without
violating any provision of the CSA. 182
A second set of laws that promotes marijuana involves state participation in
the marijuana market. Most of the laws falling into this category remain purely
hypothetical, as few proposals have actually been enacted. For example, a few
states have considered creating state-owned and operated marijuana dispensaries
that would provide marijuana directly to qualified patients, replacing private
vendors who now control the market. 183 There is much to be said for direct state
involvement in the dispensation of marijuana. It would give the states
unprecedented control over the medical marijuana market, assuaging some
concerns over diversion of the drug into recreational uses 184 as well as concerns
over the safety of marijuana now being provided to patients by under-regulated
private dispensaries.185 Indeed, states employed a similar strategy to ease their way
out of alcohol prohibition, giving state liquor stores a monopoly over the retail
distribution of alcoholic beverages.186 As it stands, however, no state has yet passed
legislation that would establish a state-owned/operated marijuana dispensary
system.187
State cultivation and distribution of marijuana would clearly pose a direct
conflict with the CSA. The state itself would be violating Section 841‘s prohibition
on the cultivation/distribution of marijuana, no less than private dispensaries do

182. See supra Part II.A.3.
183. See Travis Koch, Oregon Ballot Measures: Some Get Support Others Slip Away, NBC 5 (Nov.
8, 2012, 11:25 AM), http://www.kobi5.com/news/local-news/item/oregon-measures-get-support-otherfaulter.html (describing, and noting the failure of, Oregon‘s 2012 Ballot Measure 80, which would have
created a state commission to buy and sell marijuana); John M. Glionna, San Francisco to Consider
Growing Pot After Prop. S Passes, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/
2002/nov/07/local/me-calwrap7 (discussing how passage of Proposition S in California prompted San
Francisco city officials to consider creating a program to grow and distribute marijuana for medical use).
184. See, e.g., Kirk Mitchell & Ryan Parker, Colorado’s Medical Pot Industry Fuels Illegal Trade,
Review Shows, DENVER POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci
_21221031/colorados-medical-pot-industry-fuels-illegal-trade-review (reporting that marijuana from
medical marijuana suppliers in Colorado had been diverted to criminal drug operations in more than
seventy instances since 2010).
185. E.g., Joe Monzingo, The Green Rush: Private Labs are Testing Pot in a Legal Vacuum, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1 (noting the quality-control and contamination problems that medical
marijuana consumers face in an unregulated market).
186. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from
Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MILBANK Q., 461, 476 (1991) (describing ―the Rockefeller plan,‖ a
proposal that would grant states exclusive control of the retail sale of spirits, wine and beer above 3.2%
alcohol in an effort to eliminate the profit motives of private businesses that benefit from liquor sales).
187. See Mikos, supra note 114, at 1438.
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now.188 It would be physically impossible for the state employees tasked with
operating a state dispensary to perform their required duties while also complying
with the CSA‘s prohibition against marijuana trafficking.189
A third set of laws that could potentially promote marijuana-related activities
involves the provision of public benefits to known marijuana users. 190 The states
operate a number of important benefit programs designed to help low-income
residents obtain basic needs, such as food, housing, and medical care. 191 Though
states have frequently denied drug users access to such benefits, 192 a few are now
opening their coffers to qualified medical marijuana patients. 193
Unlike providing marijuana, providing public benefits to medical marijuana
users does not necessarily pose a direct conflict with the CSA. After all, the CSA
does not forbid anyone from feeding, housing, or providing medical care to people
who use drugs. The CSA does, however, prohibit anyone from aiding and abetting
the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana. 194 It is thus possible that a
benefit program that is specifically designed to promote a violation of the CSA
would pose a direct conflict, for the program would satisfy the elements of aiding
and abetting liability.195 Oregon voters, for example, recently rejected a ballot
measure that would have provided state funds specifically to help low-income

188. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2011) (―[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . .
.to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance.‖).
189. See GARVEY, supra note 9, at 15 (providing commentary from one U.S. Attorney noting that
state employees who participate in any state-authorized growing, distributing and possession of
marijuana are still in violation of federal laws).
190. See, e.g., Jessica Dyer, Medical Pot User to Keep Subsidy, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.abqjournal.com/north/25232284943north11-25-10.htm (reporting how one New Mexico
public housing authority decided not to terminate a medical marijuana user‘s Section 8 housing
subsidy); Noelle Crombie, Marijuana’s Medicinal Value Boosted by Oregon’s Food Stamp Deduction,
OREGONIAN (July 3, 2012, 7:59 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/health/index.ssf/2012/07/
marijuanas_medicinal_value_gai.html (permitting food stamp applicants who qualify for Social Security
Disability Insurance to deduct medical marijuana costs from their income).
191. See generally GOVBENEFITS.GOV: A PROGRESS REPORT TO CITIZENS 2 (2008), available at
http://www.benefits.gov/static/benefits/en/html/progress-report-2008.pdf (displaying 611 federally
funded but state-administered benefit programs including food stamps, public housing, and Medicaid
programs).
192. See PATRICIA ALLARD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 3 tbl.1 (2002), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/women_lifesentences.pdf
(displaying
welfare
eligibility limitations state-by-state for individuals convicted of certain drug offenses). Twenty-two
states deny benefits entirely to individuals with drug convictions. Id.
193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2011) (―Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.‖).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that aiding and
abetting liability requires an establishment that a person had knowledge of the illegal activity, as well as
a desire for the illegal activity to be successful).
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residents buy medical marijuana from private suppliers. 196 Had it passed, program
employees arguably could have been charged with aiding and abetting violations of
the CSA—they would, after all, give residents money with the specific intent of
helping them to buy marijuana.197 It seems safe to assume, however, that most
public benefit programs do not have the specific purpose of facilitating violations
of the CSA and thus do not pose a direct conflict. For example, providing public
housing might help residents to obtain marijuana in some indirect way (e.g., by
boosting disposal income),198 but the program is clearly not designed for that
purpose.
It is important to note, however, that the states‘ power to provide federally
funded benefits to marijuana users might be further circumscribed by conditions
imposed on federal grants. For example, the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has barred states from considering resident‘s medical
marijuana expenses in determining their eligibility to receive federally funded food
stamps administered by the states.199 Similarly, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) has instructed states to deny federally funded public
housing assistance to individuals engaged in illegal drug activity. 200
***
In sum, only a few state marijuana reforms pose a direct conflict with the
CSA. Laws requiring landlords to rent property for distributing or consuming
marijuana clearly pose such a conflict and are preempted. So are proposals that
would directly involve the state in the actual distribution of marijuana. Laws
requiring police to return marijuana seized from private citizens might be
preempted, but there are sound legal arguments suggesting police do not violate the
CSA in administering such laws and hence do not create a direct conflict with the
law. Apart from these few measures, state marijuana reforms are not preempted.

196. See Anne Williams, Drug Debate, REGISTER-GUARD, Oct. 16, 2010, at A1 (discussing the 2010
Oregon ballot initiative).
197. Id. (noting that the proposed ballot initiative would have permitted the health authority to use
state revenue to develop a program to assist low-income residents in obtaining medical marijuana).
198. See ECONSULT CORP., ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 13 (2007),
available at http://www.myphalinks.com/userfiles/file/final_report.pdf (reporting in one study that
housing subsidies increased participants‘ household disposable income by fifty-seven percent, thereby
allowing them to afford other items).
199. Memorandum from Lizbeth Silbermann, Dir., Program Dev. Div., to Regional Dirs.,
Supplemental
Nutrition
Assistance
Program
(July
10,
2012),
available
at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/government/pdf/Medical_Deductions-Illegal_Substances.pdf.
200. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.854(b) (2012). It is worth noting, however, that HUD allows local housing
authorities to evict drug users, but it does not require them to do so. Id. at § 5.858.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a new and clearer approach to judging whether a state
law is preempted by the federal CSA. Under this approach, called the direct conflict
rule, state law is preempted only to the extent it requires someone to violate the
CSA. The direct conflict rule has several advantages over the broader conflict
preemption rule now in widespread use by courts and commentators. It avoids a
nettlesome constitutional problem created by the unthinking application of obstacle
preemption principles.201 It protects congressional interests by preserving state
power to impose restrictions on the marijuana market. 202 It also better reflects
Congress‘s express desire to limit the scope of preemption. 203 What is more, the
direct conflict rule is simpler to apply and should help alleviate some of the
confusion now plaguing state and local marijuana regulations. 204
The Article demonstrates that the states already have wide latitude to reform
their marijuana laws. Even without further congressional amendment, the CSA,
properly understood, preempts only a handful of the laws now being promulgated
throughout the states. This clarification of the boundaries of state power vis-à-vis
the federal government should help resolve one of the thorniest questions now
confronting state policymakers. Knowing what they are allowed to do in light of
federal law, those state policymakers can now focus more attention on what they
should do.

201.
202.
203.
204.

See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.B.

